INTRODUCTION
In the Event—toward an Anthropology of Generic Moments

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Against the Case as Illustration: The Event in Anthropology

The exploration of events and situations has long been at the focus of anthropological ethnographic description. In common with many other disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, this has been so in two main and frequently combined senses: (1) as exemplifications or illustrations, usually in the form of case studies, of more general ethnographic descriptive or theoretical assertions, or (2) as happenings or occasions, slices of life, that establish a conundrum or problematic that the presentation of an ethnography and its analysis will solve or otherwise explain. Most anthropological ethnographies offer examples or variations of the first. The second is relatively common, especially among historians, but perhaps the work of Clifford Geertz is the most celebrated example in anthropology. An outstanding instance is Geertz’s (1980) study *Negara*, which opens with the mass suicide of the Balinese court before the Dutch invaders. This event sets the stage for his exploration of the Balinese theatre state.

The concern with events and situations in this issue seeks to extend beyond these more or less conventional usages and to argue for a deepening of the methodological significance of events and situations in anthropological ethnographic practice. The overall direction of the approach that I essay is one that takes the event as central to anthropological analysis rather than the concept of society, in relation to which the event or the event-as-case is commonly engaged, either to substantialize the abstract (society) or to provide a means to grasp the foundational or general organizational principles of society. The argument that I develop and toward which the articles in this issue are variously directed expresses both a continuity with conventional event-as-case approaches and, most importantly, a break with such perspectives. Ultimately, the aim is toward the exploration of the event as a singularity in which critical dimensions can be conceived as opening to new potentialities in the formation of social realities.
or what post-structuralists, especially of a Deleuzian persuasion (see Deleuze 2004; Deleuze and Guattari 1987), would describe as the continual becoming of the social as a complex emerging and diversifying multiplicity that is enduringly open and not constrained within some kind of organized, interrelated totality of parts, either as real (existent), imagined, modeled, or projected. Hitherto, such a view has largely been presented as a philosophical abstraction despite claims to the contrary, as in assertions of transcendental empiricism (Deleuze and Guattari 1994) in opposition, for example, to a Kantian transcendental idealism that underpins much Durkheimian anthropology and sociology.

I start this discussion with the early development of an event approach in anthropology, initiated by Max Gluckman’s Manchester School, which was partly motivated in the direction of more recent post-structuralist orientations. The efforts of the Manchester group continue to be instructive regarding the limitations of event/situational analysis, as well as its renewed potential in the context of the current, if in critical ways distinct, methodological turn toward the event (Badiou 2006; Deleuze 2004).

Events and Situations: Gluckman’s Manchester School

For the Manchester School, events and/or situations (or situated practices) were not to be regarded in Gluckman’s words as ‘apt illustrations’ of ethnographic generalizations concerning patterns or types of socio-cultural practice. The events or situated events that they analyzed were not significant as typical slices of lived reality as generally descriptively understood. They were not to be seen as examples of a general pattern of action that might otherwise be indicated through interviews or social surveys. If anything, the events or situated practices attended to by the Manchester anthropologists were atypical, and their close investigation would reveal dimensions of the potentialities of the realities within which they irrupted. The atypicality of the events was of primary interest, most especially of those that expressed conflict and crisis or threw into relief the social and political tensions that were conceived as being at the heart of everyday life. Events of conflict or of tension effectively constitute what the Manchester School (and before them the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Zambia) defined as significant events or practices that were likely to reveal the social and political forces engaged in the generation or production of social life. Rather than normative harmony or social integration—a common structural and functional orientation of the times in which cases or events were selected for their typicality—it was events that broke the apparent calm or routine of everyday life that were the focus of Gluckman’s Manchester anthropology. Events of conflict or events that manifested social and political tension were not conceived of as dysfunctional or pathological, as in so much functional analysis; rather, they were seen positively as being vital in the definition and reproduction of social and political relations. In Gluckman’s analyses, irresolute contradictions in the social principles underpinning social life gave rise to recurring conflicts that could also drive radical social and political transformations of a kind that
broke with patterns of the past and produced original institutional orders. For example, contrary to colonialist European imaginaries, some forms of chieftainship and kingship in southern African situations were comparatively egalitarian and were centers of redistribution rather than accumulation. Gluckman was interested, especially with regard to his Zulu research, in how such institutions of rule could transform into dictatorial tyrannies. This interest was connected to Gluckman’s distinction between, on the one hand, change that involved a series of adjustments to dynamics of conflict (often expressed in patterns of social and political rebellion that appeared to repeat or reproduce the same institutional structures and customary values) and, on the other hand, change that took a more radical transformational and revolutionary form, involving the creation of new institutional and customary orders, as in the political-military system established by Shaka Zulu. However, despite the recognition of these two kinds of change, Gluckman and his colleagues tended to see all change as proceeding in a linear temporal direction and as underpinning the key concept of process, which they introduced into the anthropological lexicon.

The Manchester approach to the analysis of apparently atypical non-normative events was that such events express incommensurabilities or incontroversibilities that are integral to social relations. In terms of the Deleuzian perspective, which will be addressed later, the events of conflict upon which Gluckman and his colleagues concentrated were ‘plateaus of intensity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). That is, they were moments in which the intransigencies and irresolvable tensions ingrained in social and personal life (the two being inseparable) boiled to the surface and became, if only momentarily, part of public awareness for the participants as well as for the anthropologist.

The methodological value that the Manchester group placed on events—specifically, events of conflict and contestation and not just any event or act or practice—was that they revealed what ordinary and routine social practices of a repeated, ongoing kind tend to obscure. Gluckman argued that events of conflict or eventful irr uptions of social and personal crisis should be neither sidelined in ethnographic description in favor of the typically routine nor treated as exceptions, as in much anthropological description of the period. The innovation of Gluckman and the Manchester School was to make the event of crisis, the event of vital conflictual intensity, a primary focus of anthropological attention. Moreover, the critical event—atypical but not necessarily exceptional—was switched from being of secondary importance in anthropological ethnography (of ‘the exception proves the rule’ kind) to being of primary methodological worth (a site of potential), calling for more thorough investigation of its ethnographic realities.

Accordingly, Gluckman made the methodological recommendation that events be recorded in their fullest detail and in excess of the analytical requirements of those that struck the fieldworker as appropriate at the time. Thus, events were no more to be regarded as mere examples that necessarily supported the general ethnographic accounts within which they were nested. Furthermore, he advocated the description of events, as much as possible, from multiple perspectives or positions in the process of the forming of the event (see also Fibiger,
this issue). Gluckman insisted that the ethnographers should make thoroughly evident their own positioning, including the sociological and personal factors involved in their own access and situating in the action of the event.

Here it should be noted that Gluckman’s insistence on detail was connected to his belief in anthropology as an empirical science whose arguments should be testable in terms of the evidence provided. Although he accepted the importance of mathematics and statistics as methods for the validation of anthropological assertions, Gluckman understood anthropology to be thoroughly grounded in fieldwork observation. This, in his view, did not permit the abandonment of scientific rigor. The common representation of anthropology as a qualitative, interpretive discipline is often used to excuse anthropologists from certain criteria of scientific validation. The measures employed in anthropology might be different from many of the physical or biological sciences, but in Gluckman’s opinion they should be no less exacting. Thus, a major objective of the emphasis on apparently excessive detail over and above the analytic or interpretive needs of the ethnographer was to enable reanalysis by other anthropologists in order to test the veracity of both the argument and the observation. For Gluckman and others to become associated with his group, no ethnographic fact or interpretation was independent of the individual bias of the ethnographer or observer. Interpretive assumptions were seen as likely to bias the way that ethnographic information was selected for presentation, perhaps resulting in the exclusion of crucial details. Therefore, Gluckman demanded that as much of the evidence as possible upon which argument was based should be presented, the aim being to open analysis to independent falsification. Moreover, such details had to be presented, along with the interpretations that were being made of them, to assist with reanalysis. This explains the origin of the phrase ‘situational analysis’ to describe a method that did not separate data or information from the interpretational architecture relating to significance. The stress was not merely on the presentation of practices but also on the process of analytical unfolding in the course of ethnographic presentation. Situational analysis demanded a setting out of the steps that are involved in abstract understanding while descriptively laying out the dynamics and process of action encompassed in events.

The focus on events in situational analysis, in other words, addressed the teleology implicated in general ethnographic description (what C. Wright Mills described as ‘abstract empiricism’) and in the conventional presentation of case material. The point is underlined if it is compared with Geertz’s notion of ‘thick description’, which he exemplified in ethnographies such as The Religion of Java (1960) and especially The Social History of an Indonesian Town (1965). Geertz advocates a density of description, but it is not oriented to an internal destabilization of interpretation, which is an important objective behind the Manchester situational analysis approach. Quite the reverse, in fact. Geertz’s thick description appears to be a concern with the demonstration of complexity, a perspective developed further in North American postmodernist anthropology (see, e.g., Clifford and Marcus 1985), consistent with an atheoretical and anti-generalist relativism that would become a kind of fetishism of detail, diversity, and individual subjective variation in itself. Veena Das’s (1995) approach to
events in *Critical Events* should also be distinguished. Although superficially it might be seen as affiliated with the Gluckman orientation (due to the focus on conflict and crisis), the argument that she presents is another instance of the case as exemplary, as demonstrating general patterns—the case as illustration.

The Manchester stress on the steps in anthropological argument through the presentation of the event-ful practice upon which an anthropological analysis is built, along with an attention to the positioning of the anthropologist in the course of witnessed processes, bears some comparison with Husserl’s recommendation for a scientific approach to human action. Husserl (1970) stressed that the distinction between a science of human being and other sciences was that the key instrument of the former is human being itself. This has major importance for the general anthropological recommendation of participant observation, and Gluckman’s situational analysis was intended to carry it forward. I comment here that Gluckman was avowedly Durkheimian, particularly in the sense that he was convinced of a science of society, but in an anti-sociological positivist way. Gluckman did not consider that the facts spoke for themselves, and the result was the situational analysis that he and his colleagues advocated. What Gluckman took from Durkheim was the emphasis on the social principles and institutional order of human social existence and the need for a methodology that was founded in this fact. Situational analysis and the event approach that Gluckman pioneered were to constitute just such an approach.

Much of the foregoing is made relatively clear in Gluckman’s ([1940] 1958) now classic account of the bridge-opening ceremony in Zululand, Natal, South Africa. The bridge opening is significant as a critical event in the sense that it related vitally to the South African racial divide, the dominant socio-political cleavage as Gluckman wrote about it, and the complexities in its bridging (both literally and metaphorically). In many ways, the analysis that Gluckman was to build out of the event anticipated later discussions on the nature of hegemonic forces, the structures of discipline in colonial orders, and the dynamics of the invention of tradition, among other topics. The order of his essays connected to this event, with the last pursuing a problematic abstract discussion about social reproduction and the relation between equilibrium and change (Gluckman 1968), is partly intended to demonstrate that his argument arises out of the kind of detailed evidence he provides and the questions that it raises. Whether this is achieved is a matter of debate. Much of the argument he presents might have been made regardless of the details that he sets forth, although they do demonstrate a depth of penetration into the minutiae of social practices of the larger socio-economic and political forces that were at work globally and in South Africa at the time—details that a colonialist and traditionalist anthropology of the time ignored. However, these merits should not obscure the methodological point in Gluckman’s concern with detail as a way to facilitate the necessity for the anthropologist to lay out the grounds and the kinds of observational evidence or sources from which the anthropologist’s explanations and general descriptive assessments emerged.

Gluckman (1949) made this explicit in a trenchant attack on Bronislaw Malinowski’s (1945) attempt to use anthropology in a consultant role to the white
South African government, in which Malinowski appeared to abandon his anthropological and methodological prescriptions for sound understanding—among them, long-term immersion in the ethnographic context. Gluckman presented Malinowski’s statements regarding change in Africa as being based on a superficial understanding fueled by theoretical opinions that had no basis in fact. Malinowski’s demonstration of the worth of anthropological ethnography was subverted by the master himself. Gluckman regarded his recommendation of the methodology of situational analysis as an extension of the importance of Malinowski’s own discoveries of the importance of participant-based ethnography and the attention to detail.

Gluckman’s situational analysis was developed further by his Manchester colleagues. J. Clyde Mitchell extended the method in his important essay *The Kalela Dance* (1956a), which explored practices of urban ethnicity in the Zambian Copperbelt. The *kalela* dance satisfied the notion of the event as crisis and as the playing through of conflict. It was a competitive contest, and in the dances and songs a conflict of interpretations was played out regarding the forming of customary life from the point of view of the diverse multi-ethnic African population of the Copperbelt. Through the *kalela* event, Mitchell examined the processes underpinning the social construction of ethnicity and the role of identity in the constitution of social relations (what he described as ‘categorical relations’) that were situationally relative. The analysis is sometimes presented as an example of established sociological understandings concerning social and cultural stereotyping, but in keeping with the anti-normative orientation of the Manchester School, Mitchell was concerned with the situated limitations (i.e., the occasions governing the appropriate use of identity categories) of such stereotyping and the social circumstances of its engagement. In anthropology, the work was well in advance of its time. Anticipating Fredrik Barth’s *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969) by more than 10 years, it stressed a similarly labile constructivist dynamic but without the individualist rationalist assumptions, whereby Barth conceived the use or lack of ethnic categories being a matter of individual choice and having little connection to the structuring of situated relations. One of Mitchell’s critical concerns was the degree to which the practices that he recorded indicated the emergence of new directions in socio-cultural conceptions and practices, which he attempted to test through statistical analysis.

Here I underline Mitchell’s use of statistical (and later mathematical) concepts in anthropological work and, in Mitchell’s opinion, its conditionality upon situational analysis. Statistical work—the construction of interviews and the statistical search for significant patterns—was seen by Mitchell to be dependent on the insights gained through the observation of situated practices. Nothing could be discovered regarding the complexities of interpersonal relations and the social processes implicated in the relatively gross patterns that statistical analysis might pick up without the intensive analysis of situated action. Theory was to be derived from such action and to some degree tested through statistical work, which was to define its testable criteria on the basis of grounded observational experience that also facilitated the interpretation of statistics. Undertaking
a statistical and mathematical analysis of human social phenomena without the
derisk of reification, that is,
to constitute social realities out of essentially non-socially constituted arrange-
ments and categories of data. This kind of statistical work, along with the
development of general statements using statistically derived information, was
for Mitchell thoroughly secondary to the anthropological method of situational
analysis. The atypicalities of the event provided the basis for the establishment
of the patterns and typicalities of statistics—the effectively normative direction
of the descriptive statistics of much sociology. The study of statistical analysis
was, in Mitchell’s view, thoroughly dependent on ethnographic work that was
alive to social variation and its situated production.

Gluckman’s orientation was built around the idea that human realities are
in constant flux: change rather than stasis is their circumstance. A protagonist
of historical interpretations that aligned with this viewpoint, he maintained it
steadfastly with regard to the southern African context. This was at the root
of his critique of the anthropology that Malinowski appeared to advocate—the
notion of so-called traditional societies as static, totalized entities in themselves
for whom change was deeply problematic. Gluckman insisted that the focus
of anthropology should be on change, as this was the normal condition of all
societies. Further, his implication was that the idea of society as it had been
sociologically developed, especially by Durkheim, was a conceptual abstrac-
tion, a fiction that was designed to enable the theoretical understanding of
the innumerable and differentiated complexities of everyday life and that, in
some sense, must always be speculative. Gluckman’s concept of equilibrium,
which was much misunderstood at the time, was a theoretical construct that
would be directed to the understanding of process rather than stasis and would
be continually open to reformulation on the grounds of situated evidence. His
notion of equilibrium was effectively a model in the scientific sense—a way
of conceiving the totality that was continually subject to reformulation as a
consequence of situated analyses (see Gluckman 1968).

Mitchell stressed the situationally relative nature of social action. Not only
are there multiple kinds of social orders through which human beings pass in
contemporary societies, but also these are variable in terms of the way that they
determine or influence the particular definition of the person and the structur-
ing of social relations. In modern Zambia, people could be part of kinship-based
tribal social worlds, at one moment, and participants in social and political
action that had everything to do with the class processes of urban society, at
another moment. The concepts of ‘modern’ and of ‘tradition’ made little sense.
In the Zambian context, tribalism—that is, the attachment to tribal or, rather,
ethnic identities—was thoroughly a dimension of urban modernity (in Mitch-
ell’s analysis, most evident in situations outside the highly controlled contexts
of industrial mine labor) and was most observable in everyday, casual contexts
of social interaction that were not dominated by overarching institutional orders.
Tribalism, as used by Mitchell, was a contemporary form of the invention of tra-
dition (in effect, a break with the traditional and its reinvention), rather than
the continuity of customary practices that is most apparent in rural areas, where
tribal identity was assumed and not involved in the everyday construction of social intercourse as it is among erstwhile strangers in town.\textsuperscript{12}

Mitchell’s urban work focused on the heterogeneity of municipal life. He did not envisage life in the towns of Zambia as coherently ordered, functionally interrelated systems; rather, he viewed city life as a multiplicity—as sets of different practices emergent under a variety of different and continually differentiating situated circumstances. He was moving away from Gluckman’s more totalizing system constituted around fundamental social contradictions that were manifested in a diversity of conflicts at the surface of everyday life.\textsuperscript{13} Gluckman’s notion of situational analysis had been highly influenced by Evans-Pritchard’s ([1937] 1976) concept of situational selection, whereby different social logics come into operation relative to the social issue and the kinds of social relations involved. The idea had been developed in the context of a discussion about Zande witchcraft practices to show how apparently contradictory practices and understanding could co-exist without threatening the socio-cultural order of the overall system as such. The point being made was that human beings do not live their worlds as coherent wholes but always in a situated and fractionalized way. This was the real (or actuality) in Gluckman’s sense and why situational analysis was an appropriate method. However, this did not rule out the analytical value of the concept of system and the determination of underlying system-related contradictions. In Gluckman’s Marxist-influenced understanding, the always situated nature of lived existence was the primary factor that inhibited the emergence to consciousness (or withheld from participants an awareness) of contradictions running through the diversities of lived practice. Mitchell was less convinced of such an orientation than was Gluckman, and in his urban work and later his research into social networks (see Mitchell 1969), he was moving away from the idea of system altogether.

Germinal to both Gluckman’s and especially Mitchell’s situational orientation is a shift away from a totalizing concept of society (or community) as a bounded, integrated whole. Furthermore, the critical focus of analysis was not society but rather the event or situation as entities of practice. These were not necessarily microcosms of the macrocosm or particular expressions of the social whole as some kind of static social order but aspects (or moments) of its continual historical formation along a multitude of dimensions. In other words, the social whole is itself relative and dependent on the kind of issue being addressed. Thus, certain problems might see the social whole as related to global processes that are very distant from the particular events or situations of ethnographic description and involve processes that affect, but are not integral within, the social institutions or relations that are characteristic of a particular social order. With reference to some of Gluckman’s own examples, the Zulu wars against the Boers and the British were driven by political developments in Europe that were not immediately apparent to the Zulu themselves, an argument that, much later, Eric Wolf (1982) would independently develop more strongly. Similarly, tribal relations, as well as African and white colonial political conflict in the Copperbelt, had to consider the structure of capitalist socio-economic orders in Northern Europe and the Americas. A focus on event and situation in relation to the problematics that
they addressed made it difficult to write about society as some kind of integrated, coherent whole. Thus, those in Gluckman’s Manchester School began to prefer more fluid and open concepts, such as social field and social arena (see Bailey 1969; Kapferer 1972; Turner 1957, 1974). Both John Barnes (1954) and Mitchell (1969) were to push beyond conventional social-institutional analysis and to pioneer social network approaches that stressed different patterns of relationality.

Events Over the Long Term: Extended Case Analysis

The directions pioneered by Gluckman and Mitchell were further developed by Jaap van Velsen and especially Victor Turner. Broadly, they were concerned not with events as one-time occurrences but with the effects of events over the long term and their realization of original structures of action and meaning.

In his now classic monograph on the Ndembu of Zambia, *Schism and Continuity in an African Society*, Turner (1957) explored a series of interlinked events of crisis (or social dramas, as he termed them) that were driven by political ambition and influenced by contradictory principles involving marriage and the relationships of powerful males vis-à-vis their matri-kin, women especially. In Turner’s analysis, Sandombu (the key protagonist whose career Turner followed) is in many respects an outsider whose actions throw into relief underlying systemic tensions and who brings into play new possibilities as a result of changes in the political economic environment, such as cash farming, and new modes of settlement unconstrained by village orders. Van Velsen (1964) followed a similar course of analysis as that of Turner, breaking away even more strongly from the structural functionalism of the time and its tendency to stress system integration without paying due attention to the innovations that actors applied toward the apparent rules of practice. Through a series of events, van Velsen explored how individuals worked customary conventions in novel social directions, thus effecting new arrangements and rules of social practice. But it was Turner who realized most of all a key implication of Gluckman’s situational analysis—that it is through a focus on events that anthropologists can come to grips with social processes in their creative and generative moments.

Here I underline the significance of the move of both Turner and van Velsen to the consideration of the event as such. This involved a stronger shift away from the idea of society as a bounded and institutionally interrelated whole, although the notion of systemic relations, which embraced a diversity of social orders and underpinned their processes, was sustained. Gluckman especially emphasized the idea of system over society; thus, the diverse social orders and societies in South Africa were thoroughly overarched and underpinned by the racist principles of the color bar of apartheid, which constituted what he regarded as an overdetermining dominant principle (or cleavage) that shaped conflicts at all levels (Gluckman 1955b, 1965). Systemic principles that were more embracing, such as those of globalizing industrial and political economic orders, were to a major extent conceived by Gluckman as vital, if differently, in all domains, including, for example, rural and urban social life in southern
Africa. Turner and van Velsen maintained this systemic vision but shifted more strongly toward an event-focused interactional perspective and, in Turner’s case, a more phenomenological one.

Turner is chiefly responsible for the development of the event as a locus of creativity and change. This was already explicit in his early *Schism and Continuity in an African Society* (1957) and in *The Drums of Affliction* (1968), although it was constrained by his effectively structural functionalist processual formula of the social drama (breach, crisis, resolution, reintegration). It is in his later ritual work that Turner realizes the fully generative potential of the event. He saw particular events in ritual to be critical in the reconfiguration of existential realities (cognitive and social structural), overturning the conventional anthropological orientation to rite as the reproduction of an unchanging tradition, the repetition of the same. This is evident in Turner’s stress on the liminal events of ritual (see Turner 1969) in which counteracting forces or principles are at play—an idea that owes as much to Nietzsche’s (1993) Apollonian/Dionysian contest as it does to van Gennep (1960). But Turner does not remain bound to the problematic of ritual. He quickly expands the notion of the critical and generative event to an array of historical and contemporary world-changing occurrences, from Thomas à Beckett’s murder to Hidalgo’s *Grito* that sparked the Mexican War of Independence to the events of Paris in 1968 (Turner 1974). In his analyses, he concentrates on the accidental, the fortuitous, the way in which the contingent eschews the overdetermination of events in structure, and the forces that they may unintentionally unchain. With Turner, the event is a relatively open phenomenon that manifests a multiplicity of potential, a diversity of possible outcomes (perhaps best exemplified in his discussion of Hidalgo).

The development of the event and situational analysis concepts continued at Manchester. Kapferer’s (1972) study of African factory workers in Zambia applies a Turner-style analysis of interconnected events of crisis to an urban-industrial context, showing how the emergence of various forms of social association within the larger circumstances of political transition out of colonial rule influenced efforts for better work conditions. However, the argument was framed through an attention to exchange theory approaches (see Blau [1964] 1986; Gouldner 1965), effectively maintaining the idea of the event as an illustration or representation of external theory and, in so doing, reducing the intention of situational analysis to develop theory from the ethnographic grounds of lived practices. The capacity of the event to be in itself the source of new conceptual understanding and theoretical comprehension—as indicated in Mitchell’s *The Kalela Dance* and in van Velsen’s and especially Turner’s work—was diminished. This was much less so with Handelman’s (1975) study of a sheltered workshop in Israel. In it, Handelman addressed Erving Goffman’s interactionist perspective, which had quite independently treated events or routine interactive encounters as the source of novel conceptualization and theorization. Handelman challenged many of Goffman’s abstract formulations with similar kinds of ethnographically grounded evidence.

In a later work, Handelman (1998) extended further in his event-centered direction, attempting a classification of types of events involving reanalyses of
a range of different ethnographic materials. There are important methodological questions at the root of Handelman’s development on event and situational analysis, among the more crucial being a major concern with the generalized classification and definition of events. The event is no longer essentially defined in terms of the dynamics of conflict or contradiction but in terms of its degree of institutionalization and routinization. Handelman effectively establishes a continuum from open, unstructured events, at one end, to highly formalized and institutionalized events, at the other end. Overall, his work is designed to explore the ways in which events either dominantly represent (and can therefore be studied in terms of how they express structuring principles and the key processes by which human beings systematically assemble their realities) or else exhibit a high degree of openness, perhaps leading to new kinds of structural arrangements or systematizations of practice. The approach deserves attention, not only because it offers a means for classifying events, but also, and perhaps more significantly, because it presents a way to discriminate between events independently of how they relate to larger structural/cultural forces within which they are embedded. Handelman develops a sociology of events as such.

One difficulty in the powerfully interactionist perspective of Handelman (and also Kapferer) is the implication that the circumstances of face-to-face interaction are also those of large-scale processes. To put it another way, all processes, in some way or another, are small group processes, despite any major global effects that may be rooted in them. The suggestion is that although such encounters may appear to be on the order of a different register or scale, similar interactional principles may be observed in them: what is transpiring in the Oval Office is essentially little different from the kind of negotiation that may be taking place in the classroom. There is a potentially immanent reductionism in this perspective (which Gluckman’s systemic emphasis was intended to combat), and it is exacerbated by a tendency to overlook the likely possibility that the dynamic quality of particular events may vary according to the forces at which they are the locus and which may affect the internal processes of events but are not reducible to them. The relation between apparently larger, encompassing molar processes and local or small everyday interactive events is of major issue in any analysis based in events,14 as Charles Tilly (1989) indicated and as Marshall Sahlins (2005) has pursued more recently in the context of a somewhat different approach to the event. Sahlins’s work is significant, as I shall discuss, due to his introduction of cultural value into event analysis. This adds another dimension to the dynamics of event that counteracts certain aspects of the reductionism to which event analysis may be prone.

Elaborations and Innovations

What counts as an event for analysis is highly problematic, and there is always a risk that the event merely becomes ‘Society’ writ small—a micro representation of society or systems that, furthermore, is often treated as representing the dynamic processes of the whole. This was a clear dimension of the approach
to the examination of situated events by the Manchester anthropologists and is a factor underlying their expressed frustration at the incapacity of much situational analysis to escape the critique of the use of events as mere illustrative cases or representations of normative processes. Mitchell would complain that even though the Manchester concern with events demanded a greater attention to ethnographic complexity and detail, the approach was nonetheless saddled with the event as a gimmick, a device for introducing a problem for analysis, rather than being vital in itself to the creative and productive work of analytical ethnographic conceptualization and understanding. The event as a descriptive device still dominates in most anthropology. However, the stress in the Manchester orientation to focus on events of crisis—in which the participants are effectively engaging with the taken-for-granted assumptions of reality and redefining the nature of their orientations to reality—is still a fruitful course.

The Manchester situational analysis approach to events was methodologically innovative in anthropology. Obviously, as Gluckman and his colleagues recognized, similar perspectives had been adopted elsewhere in the humanities and social sciences. The study of jural practices (Gluckman 1955a), psychoanalysis, and Kurt Lewin’s psychodrama perspective were influential, as was Marx’s (1852) analysis of the events of the 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. Turner’s discussion of major events that constituted turning points in history (referred to above) parallels Max Weber’s attention to historical switch points whereby political and social processes took a new direction. In these senses, the Manchester situational perspective demonstrated an anthropology that not only was addressing critically normative paradigms but also was opening the discipline up to other orientations. Despite its potential, situational and event analysis saw little expansion outside the domain of the Manchester School and largely faded as an anthropological methodological experiment. The event was maintained as exemplary or illustrative rather than as in itself a dynamic process (the Manchester innovation) that potentially constitutes an original structuring of relations or plane of emergence that is irreducible as a representation of the order of surrounding realities.

However, more recently there has been a growth of interest in event analysis, partly in response to a collapse in the totalizing paradigms of society and system. Some have consciously expanded on the Manchester initiative. Michael Burawoy (2000), a student of van Velsen, has adapted it to the exploration of contemporary transnational contexts of globalization. Others such as Das (1995), who makes no reference to Manchester, and Alexander, Giesen, and Mast (2006), who make use of Turner’s dramatic and performance perspective, have given events a critical place in their analyses. However, none of these extend beyond the event as illustrative or as encapsulating a density of detailed practice whereby larger forces can be intensively explored. Indeed, there has been a widespread tendency to reduce the study of events, including the Manchester approach, to a concern with the dynamics of practice or to look at it in terms of micro-history, which in the view expressed here tends to miss the central points of situational analysis.
The Event in a Structuralist Register

Marshall Sahlins’s (1980, 1985, 2004) studies of Hawaii and Fiji, which offer a relatively novel orientation to the event, are motivated out of a concern to overcome the ahistorical aspects of Lévi-Straussian structuralism. This and the fact of his Boasian cultural emphasis might explain why Sahlins makes no reference to Manchester. It should be added that Gluckman and his colleagues were developing from within Radcliffe-Brown’s Durkheimian structuralism—despite their criticism of it, especially that of van Velsen (1967)—from which Sahlins is distanced. They were also critical of Malinowski, with whom Sahlins is altogether more sympathetic. I add that major proponents of the situational and event perspective, including Victor Turner, were openly hostile to structuralism and championed event analysis as a radical alternative. Nonetheless, Sahlins’s approach to events extends a course of analysis that parallels Manchester, overcoming some of its limitations but itself perhaps being vulnerable to difficulties that situational analysis avoided.¹⁷

Sahlins begins his attention to the event in his now classic discussion of the crisis confronting the Hawaiian king, Kalaniʻōpuʻu, when Captain James Cook, by unexpectedly returning to Hawaii, placed himself outside the cultural categories that had been adapted by the Hawaiians to make sense of his appearance (see Sahlins 1980). In the accident of his return, Cook effectively changed in practical value from being a beneficent, fruitful god into the figure of a usurping king. He revealed an intense ambiguity that was a potential threat in the Hawaiian mytho-political scheme of things and its appropriate practice. The critical occurrences that Sahlins explores are those focused on the making of Cook into the figure of the god Lono, which leads to his killing. In the Hawaiian construction of things, Cook is ‘sacrificed’ (an after-the-fact invention) and positively made into the god (a construal that persists as such in cultural cum historical memory). The possibility of Cook being a realization of the stranger king who usurps the kingship (which is part of the mythopoetic potential of Hawaiian kingship) was thereby thwarted. This is hardly a resolution of the crisis of the situation that Cook’s arrival effected, but it becomes integral to a whole series of further critical events that are vital to the creation of new potentials in the construction of Hawaiian social and political arrangements. There are shades of Gluckman’s notion of the event as part of a repetitive structure in that the changes that events manifest are part of the reproduction of the system as a whole (which does not obviate its constant, internal changing system of differentiation and diversification). There is no transformational revolution in the process (that Gluckman might have detected)—merely a dissolution of the past into the present via different meaningful arrangements of the cultural categories. There is a Malinowskian ring to Sahlins’s approach, but rather than the disorganization and pathological entropy that Malinowski stresses in his functionalism, with Sahlins (as in Geertz’s culturalism) culture or value operates positively in the creation and generation of the new or a particular adaptation to modernity.

Both Sahlins and Manchester concentrate on the dynamics of events as driven in conflict and contradiction. For the former, this is a critical dimension
of what he terms the structure of the conjuncture, which in his Hawaiian example represents a close affiliation with notions of culture contact to which the Mancunians were staunchly opposed. They argued that cultures—as interrelated systems of value, for instance—never come into contact as wholes and only ever in a partial way through the action of particular agents. This is in practice how Sahlins’s analysis operates, but the idea of conflict and contradiction as being integral to systems (the Manchester position) is nonetheless underplayed, the contradictions and tensions within the system being effectively produced and opened up through the action of the structure of the conjuncture. However, the importance of Sahlins’s approach is the very idea of the event as a structure of the conjuncture. That is, it is a structural dynamic in itself that is irreducible to any one cultural or social order and simultaneously is in effect a site of emergence out of which novel articulations of practiced reality arise. Sahlins ties this to a linear notion of historical change (how the Hawaiians became part of the globalized modern but in their own cultural way), as also does the different Manchester approach. But Sahlins’s emphasis on the original and originating structure of the event effectively gives it a relatively external independent force, rendering it unencompassed, as it were. More than a representation of systemic socio-cultural processes, the event is the site for innovative practice and (importantly in Sahlins’s work) for the practical construction of cultural memory. For example, the murder of Cook, born out of the emotional and chaotic tensions of the moment, becomes creatively reconstructed as an intended act of sacrifice, now a part of historical memory—the event as myth—that influences subsequent action, such as the Hawaiian insistence on being British. The Manchester concern to avoid the idea of the event as mere illustration is overcome by Sahlins’s attention to the structure of the event as a dynamic in itself that is also thoroughly situationally specific. It is the very specificity of the situated event (as also a dramatic site of revaluation) that gives it the potency to switch the path of change in a certain direction rather than another through both its particular actualization of a mythic consciousness and its validation via a historicized constructed memory.

New Articulations of the Event in Post-structuralist Thought: Becoming as Always Not Yet

In retrospect, Sahlins’s 1980 work and later analyses anticipate for anthropology certain post-structural developments in the philosophy of the social sciences and humanities. Here I comment on the significance attached to the event in the social philosophical orientation of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987, 1994) and also that of Alain Badiou (2001, 2006). The last claims a distinction from Deleuze, but in the framework of anthropological and ethnographic concerns, it constitutes a Lacanian ‘narcissism of minor difference’. This is not to reduce the importance of Badiou in relation to Deleuze in the context of philosophical argument (Badiou expresses a closer link with Platonic traditions than Deleuze avowedly does), but to state that for anthropology, or
the kind of anthropology that I pursue, which is ethnographically driven (see Kapferer 2007), such philosophical distinction is of little import. Both Deleuze and Badiou argue a philosophical direction that is of ontological rather than epistemological proportions. The Deleuzian turn to the event is part of a general approach that strives to break away from various oppositions and exclusivist positions that, for example, overprivilege the individual subject or the idea of society as a coherent totalized order.

In many respects, Deleuze aims for an ontological shift away from the assumptions that lie at the heart of Western modernist social and psychological theories. The emphasis is on the multiplicity of sensory and cognitive processes, which permits all kinds of agency or effect (human, non-human, structural, etc.) and patterning of relations. Rather than the notion of society *sui generis* in the Durkheimian sense, Deleuze and Guattari stress the concept of assemblage whereby particular concatenations of relation and process are actualized or brought into existence or lived practice. This orientation excludes neither systemic processes (which are characterized as different potentials of centered hierarchical dynamics) nor others that Deleuze and Guattari characterize as rhizomic and relationally a-centered but which may be intertwined with systemic dynamics. The interconnection is not, in their conception, dialectic but rather thoroughly tensional, involving entirely distinct structural logics in a dynamic that may be mutually annihilatory and irresolute in any dialectic or Hegelian sense. The event in the Deleuzian orientation becomes the critical site of emergence, manifesting the singularity of a particular multiplicity within tensional space and opening toward new horizons of potential. In Deleuze’s sense, the event is present-future oriented and not to be reduced to terms of orders, structures, and relations that can be understood only through a connection to a past or a reality that can be completely grasped in its own terms. In this, Deleuze and Guattari break out of any essentialism or determinism of a historicist, structuralist, or psychological kind without excluding such considerations altogether. These aspects are part of a continuing tensional mix, and the event may be conceived as a particular plateau of intensity that has immanent within it a potential that effectively becomes knowable through the actualizations or realizations in the event itself. The event, in their analysis, is a wellspring of emergence that is not merely a reflection (or illustration) of the world around it, as this may be described independently of the occurrence of the event, but is itself a creative crucible of new, hitherto unrealized potential.

**Deleuze and Guattari, I think, articulate** more explicitly the direction that the Manchester School and, more recently, Sahlins had already set. With regard to Manchester, Deleuze and Guattari clear away some of the analytical and theoretical baggage—the Durkheimian, Radcliffe-Brownian structural legacy—that may have burdened the Manchester anthropologists and prevented them from escaping the case as example or as mere microcosm. The Hegelianism implicit in the development of the extended case—as in Turner’s Ndembu ethnography—is committed to a teleological, linear dialectical course, as to some extent is Sahlins’s Hawaiian work, which he, perhaps self-critically, recognizes as ‘afterology’. Husserl, I note, suggested that social understanding could be
condemned to such a position, but the course indicated by Deleuze and Guattari offers one way out. Their approach conceives of the event not only as being delinked in critical ways from the past but also as opening up numerous pathways into various potential futures. It does not determine the future so much as it is determined by the event in the future in the sense that Deleuze develops in *Difference and Repetition* (2004). The future event, therefore, is not the inevitable and necessary outcome of a preceding event (as certain structural perspectives of a Hegelian or Marxist persuasion might insist), nor is it part of a determined and linked series. The connection, as it were, is made by events in the future that do not flow as a necessity from specific preceding events. In such an orientation, the importance of the detailed consideration of the practices of the event is not to demonstrate the logic of a relatively closed (and therefore repetitive) system, which I think dogs the Manchester approach and also, if less so, that of Sahlins—rather, it is to explore the novel potentiality of a becoming that is always not yet.

The importance of the event as a creative and generative nexus in the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari opens up new space for the importance of event analysis in anthropology. Notwithstanding the potential of their philosophical arguments (and those of others such as Badiou), their orientation demands the kind of grounding that anthropology always offered. But the point of the discussion here is that anthropologists have been grappling with the potential of event analysis for some time and have already demonstrated the value of such an approach, well beyond the treatment of the event as a mere exemplification or illustration of what is already known. The major anthropological positions I have explored here were already engaging the event in a way that was breaking away from what Deleuze would describe as ‘royal’ and ‘ruling’ theory and were demonstrating the potency of anthropological methodological thinking in the face of ethnographic commitment and a recognition of ethnography as being at the root of theoretical and philosophical discovery.

The Articles

The impetus and inspiration for the articles that are presented in this issue arose from two research seminars on event analysis organized by Lotte Meinert and myself on behalf of the Danish Research School of Anthropology and Ethnography in 2008 and in 2009. The discussions initially focused on the work of the Manchester School and similar perspectives that had some influence on the Manchester approach, such as the American symbolic interactionists (see Evens and Handelman 2006; Kapferer 2005b). The discussions then turned to the relatively new orientation pioneered by Sahlins and, more recently, the line of thought of the social philosophers Deleuze, Guattari, and Badiou. The articles here express various lines of inquiry involving what can be broadly termed event analysis within the spectrum that has been presented in the foregoing discussion. They can be regarded as part of an ongoing discourse and in various ways represent differing positions. This introductory essay has outlined the structure
of my thought, but many of the positions taken in the articles demonstrate some of the limitations of certain of my directions, often a dimension of the very ethnographic contexts and the problematic chosen, and stress other possibilities. Thus, the articles in this issue might be considered events in themselves—particular points in the development of specific ethnographic understandings and, most importantly, approaches that may offer a variety of analytical directions via a focus on events. The issue as a whole should be considered as a kind of becoming, offering varying and still developing approaches to ethnographic methodology that are framed by a concern with the event as the grounds as well as the plane of emergence for analytical and theoretical knowledge. In this regard, I stress the distinction of anthropology as, above all, an ethnographic discipline that conceives the source of theory and knowledge concerning human being to be in and through the creative and generative action of human beings participating in the situated circumstances of the changing and perduring problematic character of realities as always being in the process of becoming.

A critical issue that underpins many of the articles concerns the status of the event. What exactly is an event, and what are the reasons behind its selection? My suggestion is that an event should not be selected on the basis of its illustrative dimensions or because it is in some way or another a micro example of macro dynamics. These are difficult to avoid, for the event, I contend, is always likely to have these dimensions. It is because the event, at least in some intuitive way, seems to point up problematics and questions in the contexts of anthropological work that it is selected. Thus, all the events addressed in this issue are in some way or another illustrative. But they are also more than this, for by and large they contain in themselves the evidence or the evidential grounds for the analysis that builds upon them and which further may be the grounds for the establishment of new theoretical directions that are thoroughly founded in existential practice.

Events are not natural phenomena. They are always constructions and do not exist as events apart from this fact. As Sahlins expressly points out in his Hawaiian work, events achieve their import and effects through the meaning or the significance that human beings attach to them, and it is this which yields their generative impact. Initially, they might be conceived of as happenings or occurrences without any necessary meaning or significance. When they become significant, it is in their becoming an event in this sense that they achieve their import. So the events that Sahlins considers, or the happenings made into events—for example, the unforeseen and in all likelihood accidental happening of Cook’s killing, which becomes an event of defined significance as the sacrifice of a god—achieve their force in a process of conjunctive cultural construction that is both a specific arrangement and an invention of meaning. As I have already intimated, there is a similarity here with the Manchester approach (although less set within a culturistic concern with meaning that exists above and independent of the dynamics of the event), whose orientation to events is as moments of social definition that facilitate as they may alter the terms for ongoing intercourse. The discussion of events in all the articles in this issue are thoroughly concerned with the event as a construction that in various ways concentrates on the manner in
which participants constituted the event as an event (and the potential of such a construction). Furthermore, the analyses presented are in different ways concerned with laying out the kinds of evidence that form the basis for the specific and more general anthropological assessments of the processes described. Event and situational analyses effectively set out the terms internal to their analytical program as regarding the selection and intense considerations of the lived practices in situ that they address.

I underline here the constructionist approach to the event. I do so in response to the development of an anti-constructionist direction in some of the more recent discussions concerning the event, especially those influenced by the post-structuralist turn. This has been brought about by the interest of some (e.g., DeLanda 2006; Latour 2007) to break away from the anti-science directions that have received emphasis in some highly subjectivist postmodern orientations that have seen an unacceptable positivism in all science. Deleuze, Guattari, and certainly Badiou are not anti-science (with the last often appearing to take a neo-Platonist stance), and I do not conceive of them as anti-constructionist (see Hacking 2000), although they must be seen as decentering the position of human being. For some social scientists, we are in an era of the post-human (Haraway 2007; Latour 2007; see Hayles 1999 for a critique) and must therefore take into account forms of agency, effect, or constructional impetus other than those created by human beings. In other words, constructions of reality are embedded in processes that are not entirely of human invention; they are able to exert an effect on human being because they are insensible to human action. There is a reinsistence on a certain materialism, which is already powerfully apparent in Marxist perspectives and, I consider, in some phenomenology, in what may be glossed as post-structural directions. The significance of events as constructed and defined (usually in multiple ways) by human beings is emergent upon processes—for example, ecological/environmental or biological systems, interspecies relations, socio-political forces not within the direct or immediate awareness of participants—that, in their relative intransigence, force a diversity of human reactive constructions. The kinds of events upon which the authors of this issue concentrate are specifically moments of emergent consciousness that in themselves give expression to novel realizations of ongoing existence.

The articles of the issue begin with Thomas Fibiger’s analysis of the ‘Ashura Shi‘i ritual celebrations in Bahrain. His analysis provides an immediate connection to the birth of event analysis in the Manchester group, especially Turner’s development through the analysis of ritual drama. This brief introduction to the essays ends with Morten Nielsen’s contribution, which deals with the crisis of a natural disaster (an initiating point for two other articles in this issue, those by Jonas Østergaard Nielsen and Mikkel Rytter) and its socially generative effects. Morten Nielsen explicitly places the Manchester orientation in critical conjunction with a Deleuzian perspective.

The major significance of the event that Fibiger addresses is self-evident. As an annual calendrical rite of the Shi‘i majority of Bahrain, which attracts over 100,000 participants (and involves the Sunni minority as well), it is already
replete with significance and the kind of repeated occasion that should immediately attract anthropological attention. Such ceremonial and ritual events are windows into the real and imagined realities of human existence, both inside and outside ritual performances. The rite that Fibiger addresses is a manifestation of the fundamental religious and socio-political cleavage, as Gluckman would have described it, in Bahrain. As in Gluckman’s analysis of the Zululand bridge opening, Fibiger presents the diverse positions and interpretations of the significance of the practices by participants. He stresses the ceremony as a complex multiplicity that, in itself, does not reduce systematically to the kind of dominant cleavage that is integral to the overarching mythos it expresses. What Fibiger’s account addresses is the way that novel directions in Shi‘i-Sunni relations, as well as a host of other problematics, take form during the commemoration of a mythopoetic and defining event in Shi‘i-Sunni cultural and historical memory. Potentials that were hitherto only virtual can be realized. By way of contrast, in Gluckman’s kind of situational analysis, the dominant cleavage in the system permeates the meaning of the event. Fibiger suggests a more Deleuzian approach. As evidenced in his conversations with participants, the ritual is a kind of Deleuzian open, a creative moment giving rise to new social and political potentials that press well beyond its historical reference. As Turner might have said, the repetition of an old history allows for a diversity of new possibilities that may transcend the past and, as Deleuze might have noted, are determined in a future and not conditioned in preceding processes.

Bjarke Oxlund’s article describes a mock funeral held for student organizations that were aligned with the African National Congress (ANC), which had heralded in the new post-apartheid era in 1994. The essay addresses further some of the aspects raised by Fibiger. Discussing Gluckman’s situational analysis, Oxlund is explicitly concerned to avoid the case as mere illustration. He observes that he was drawn intuitively to the event because it clashed with many of his expectations or normative understandings of the South African context in which he was collecting ethnographic materials. In other words, it appeared as a generative, innovative moment in which new directions away from the immediate post-apartheid era were emergent. The mock funeral explicitly buried the ANC—creative in its very playfulness—and manifested a kind of hiatus between understandings that drew their meaning from the past, as well as a new import born of the present becoming a future. The processes engaged in the construction of the event are what Deleuze may have grasped as a dynamic of delinking from a virtual past (the plethora of potentiality and multiplicities of experience that might have made the immediate post-apartheid era) and a reorientation toward a virtual future (the potentialities that the post-apartheid student population may, over the course of their lives, come to actualize).

Vital for any discussion of events is what may be termed their locus. Where they occur in time and in space (place) is integral to what they are and can become. This is of heightened significance in ritual events, whose space (often of mythological significance) feeds imaginal potential into ritual practice, as the practice may in its own way generatively realize such potential. Jesper
Oestergaard’s essay on a Tibetan sacred cave underlines such a point, emphasizing the symbolic emplacement of events and how reference to them excites the situated dynamic of events. The place or space of events is not inert or mere background setting (context)—it is itself active in the event. This is explicit in Oestergaard’s discussion, but I suggest that it is an aspect of most events, not just those that are rituals. I add that Oestergaard’s analysis has relevance for an understanding of the virtual/actual features of events. The cave expresses a virtuality as a pregnancy of potential—a phantasmagoric space (see Kapferer 2002) that excites the imagination, perhaps aligning it in certain mythopoetic directions. It is activated and actualized via various techniques of the memory, in this case aided by photographs and their interpretation, as described by Oestergaard.

Jonas Østergaard Nielsen’s article takes up what I have stated is a post-structural interest involving the constructivist import of non-human agency in the production of socially generative effects. He is directly concerned with environmental processes that are integral to the realization of new constructions of social reality and the events of their realization. Thus, Nielsen shows how climate change and drought as non-human forces enter within the situated dynamics of social constructional events, giving them moment and facilitating a major restructuring of social relations. The article illustrates how an ecological crisis in a small village in Burkina Faso stimulated processes of creative social emergence, giving rise, for example, to new definitions of gender relations.

A similar argument is developed in Rytter’s article, which discusses the constructional processes activated by the Pakistan earthquake of 2005 in which some 70,000 people died. Following Das (1995), Rytter describes this as a critical event around which new definitions of the relations between local Pakistanis and those of the diaspora (with specific reference to Denmark) were defined. Here I note that a hallmark of the situational perspective that Gluckman and his Manchester colleagues developed related to the effect of global forces (largely industrial-economic) on situated practices that appeared to be well outside them. They in effect argued that there was no such thing as a pristine, traditional society, as often celebrated by anthropologists. Even those societies that are the most apparently radical and isolated are nonetheless enmeshed in processes that are implicated in what may otherwise appear to be their own independent self-generation, as Gluckman ([1940] 1958, 1949) and Wolf (1982) stressed. Burawoy (2000), in his readdressing of the Manchester methodological innovation, expands upon such a point and redraws situational analysis to deal more explicitly with contemporary global interconnections. As Rytter points out, globalization and cyberspace have rendered notions of society or territorially bounded and insulated social orders thoroughly redundant. They lead to more intense intertwinement, realizing unexpected mutual effects and resulting in redefinitions of the nature of relations. The unity that the Danish-Pakistani doctors felt when identifying with the earthquake victims was belied by the suppressed imperial-hierarchical relation that was implicated in the Danish doctors reaction to the disaster.

In the following article, Anja Kublitz discusses the construction of the now (in) famous matter of the 2005 Danish cartoon controversy into an event involving
irruptions of angry demonstrations by Muslim immigrants, from which emerged a new value of Muslim identity in Denmark. Interestingly, as a major point of social and political emergence, the controversy could be seen as counteracting the polarization between immigrants and those locals who stayed behind, as discussed by Rytter. Through this cartoon incident, major cleavages in Danish realities (which had been hitherto obscured or repressed) achieved definition, agency, and new meaning in the course of its construction into an event. Danish Muslims realized a greater sense of global unity, which, of course, continues to have reverberations in the structuring of both global and local relations.

The phenomenon of contemporary globalization, as I have already noted, has been implicated in a reframing of many of the key problematics of anthropological practice, some of which are evident in the articles of this issue. Corporate structures are significant drivers of global interconnections and networks, and their processes cannot necessarily be reduced to the statist kinds of discourse and dynamics that have shaped much anthropological conceptualization. A shift away from such approaches was implicit, if far from fully expressed, in Manchester situational analysis, but Jakob Krause-Jensen’s article realizes more explicitly such a potential in his discussion of a Danish electronics company. It could be argued that the Manchester emphasis on conflict and contradiction embeds a modernist-cum-statist analytical commitment. Krause-Jensen indicates that the social practices of a managerial rather than bureaucratic order refract a different style of political and social discourse (and organization of work) that might modify some of the theoretical assumptions at the root of situational analysis.

Clearly, within the corporatizing and managerial realignments of the political and of the state in globalizing contexts (see Hardt and Negri 2001; Kapferer 2010), the organization and patterning of opposition and resistance are altering. What is widely discussed as terrorism and its spread are indicating as much. The clear-cut socio-political cleavages that motivated the arguments behind Gluckman’s situational analysis (especially of the bridge opening) are becoming less apparent. Stine Krøjjer, whose article analyzes violent protests on a bridge near the French-German border during a 2009 NATO summit, takes issue directly with the case as an actualization or representation of underlying social forces. She explores the event as expressing a dynamic of emergence in itself, in which there are specters of the real or shades of potentiality in Deleuze’s sense. The analysis demonstrates the multi-positionality and shifting multi-relationality of the dynamics of the event, arguing against any solid actualization in its process of orders in a past or of those necessitated in a future. Engaging the ideas of Deleuze, Strathern, Viveiros de Castro, and others, Kroijer goes well beyond the representational dimensions of Gluckman’s bridge opening (in which the order of South Africa is realized), taking up the event in its vibrational, shadowy, virtual potentiality as a domain of becoming that cannot be grasped as an actualization of the world external to it. Nonetheless, perhaps the character of such events and their theoretical mode of understanding are related to dimensions of the crises and uncertainties of the current historical social and political juncture.
The final article, by Morten Nielsen, places Manchester situational analysis firmly within the Deleuzian post-structural frame. Rather than specific, concrete events of practice, it deals with the situational complexity and multi-directional dynamics of an urban context in which there is no clear-cut structure of control that is similar to the colonial orders addressed by Manchester situational analysis. The post-colonial and post-war realities of Maputo, Mozambique, are thoroughly in flux. Nielsen’s account addresses the strategies of securing urban residences following the Mozambique floods, which contributed to a plateau of critical intensity that opened up new forces of differentiation and lines of flight. He shows how the statist, oversystemic Gluckman approach to situated events must give way to a more Deleuzian perspective in post-flood and post–civil war Maputo. The analysis that Nielsen presents of the ways in which people secured building plots and established their urban status, among other dimensions of forming an urban way of life, demonstrates the ontological (rather than epistemological) shift that surrounds post-structuralist approaches to the event. Most importantly, Nielsen sets out an approach to the event that may avoid the dilemma of the case or event as an illustration of external realities and realizes a more generative dynamic, one that both constitutes its reality and opens up to new potential.

This issue as a whole traces a variety of orientations concerning the idea of event and situational analysis, exploring specific methodological problematics within a larger set of debates in anthropology. At times, the discussion involves critical reconceptualizations of the nature of anthropological work and the processes whereby it may generate analytical and theoretical understanding within the constantly changing lived circumstances of human existence.

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**Notes**


2. In the Manchester perspective, there is some lack of clarity concerning the relation between event and situation. There was a tendency at Gluckman’s time to associate the notion of the situation with context. If the idea of context refers to the background setting for the irruption of events, then this does not always fit with the usage of situation, which includes the structural processes emergent in the irruption of events. In this essay, I tend to discuss the events of focus in situational analysis as situated events and do not conflate the notion of situation with the idea of context as a kind of background setting or behind-the-scenes systemic order for events.

3. Gluckman stressed the positive role of witchcraft accusations and ritual demonstrations of rebellion against the kingship in the definition of social and political relations (see Gluckman 1955a, 1955b, 1963, 1965).

4. Gluckman noted that many chieftainship systems in Africa were of a *primus inter pares* sort. The chief, who was in many instances relatively impoverished, served as a conduit for the redistribution of benefits and resources rather than as an accumulative center. Moreover, those in centralized positions of power had their authority tempered by the encompassing social orders of which they were a part. The assumption of dictatorial and tyrannical powers by the nineteenth-century Zulu warrior king Shaka (also known as Shaka Zulu) was an innovative realization of an existing potentiality in the Zulu political order. Gluckman’s argument had resonance with Edmund Leach’s (1961) classic discussion of the emergence of authoritarian hierarchy out of relatively egalitarian processes—an approach that influenced Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) seminal discussions on rhizomic and statist-hierarchical dynamics. Gluckman, however, was committed to a linear orientation to change (very much influenced by a continuing Durkheimianism in his thought), which he tended to see as being impelled by external forces of a global nature.

5. Heidegger (1977: 115–128) discusses the historian’s concern with the status of sources as being equivalent to the scientist’s concern with the experiment. In different ways, both have the same aim to validate rigorously their descriptions and assessments. Gluckman—completely unaware of Heidegger—was arguing a similar position. For him, events were the grounds for anthropological judgment, description, and theory. In order for the assertions of anthropologists to have authority, the nature of the events upon which the analyses depended had to be as thoroughly presented as possible. In other words, a science of anthropology depended on a methodology, such as that of situational analysis.
6. Geertz’s (1973) famous study of Balinese cockfighting is an example of an analysis of an event, but not along the lines developed at Manchester. It is more a detailed account of an event as an illustration of the cultural nature of Bali with regard to status (developed in his discussion of *negara*). Asserting a highly cultural, relativist view, this approach does not involve a plane of emergence, which was the direction of Gluckman’s methodology as developed by Mitchell, Turner, and others.

7. As an example, Gluckman admired Durkheim’s analysis of suicide in which there is a marked attempt to make the definitions and logic of analysis transparent.

8. Mitchell’s (1956b) study of the Yao, which explored social life through a series of events, was important in the development of situational analysis and had a major influence on the work of both Victor Turner and Jaap van Velsen. Mitchell was involved in the supervision of these two scholars during their doctoral work at Manchester.


10. For Mitchell (1956), the capacity of individuals to exercise choice was a property of structural aspects of the situation coupled with the problematic relevant to the exercise of choice. In his analysis, ethnic categories in urban contexts were used to establish the terms of social relations, and this was most apparent in what he described as relatively open situations that lacked overriding dominant structures. Ethnic identity, in his view, tended not to be engaged, for example, in contexts where social relations tended to be highly determined by the organization of work. However, in places where there was no overdetermining organization that governed activity, and especially where participants were strangers to one another, then ethnic categories were used. This was so, he added, because the categories had implicit within them orientations to the formation of social relations and social conduct. He concentrated especially on the development of institutionalized joking relations between particular ethnic categories.

11. Gluckman entered into a celebrated debate over the concept of equilibrium with Leach (1961), who taunted him for being overcommitted to an understanding of stable systems. Gluckman was to retort, with some justification, that his approach was similar to Leach’s own famous discussion of the dynamics of change among the Kachin people.

12. Magubane (1971) criticized Mitchell, but he was confused by Mitchell’s concept of tribalism, which he mistakenly interpreted as traditionalist in usage, quite contrary to the intention. Magubane’s error has been compounded by Ferguson (1999). The approach that Ferguson develops is based on an extraordinary misreading of the work of Godfrey Wilson in which he attributes to Wilson a perspective that Mitchell develops in criticism of Wilson. The latter—despite his important attention to global political and economic forces—cleaved to a notion of the urban process in Zambia as a means of gradual transition away from traditional, customary values. Mitchell and Gluckman were opposed to such adaptationist and gradualist perspectives, identifying them as being aligned with colonialist administrative understandings and as failing to concentrate on the multiple structural processes that underpinned a variety of reactions to the global forces of political and economic change. Ferguson’s orientation has more in common with Mitchell’s position than that of Wilson, although in execution it is far more subjectivist and is ethnographically superficial.

13. Gluckman (1961a) had famously asserted that modern Zambia could be understood through a contrast of two systems: (1) the urban capitalist industrial order, the domain of tribalism (or ethnicity), and (2) the rural traditional order, based in traditionally structured politico-jural tribal kinship processes in which village, lineage, and kinship were the primary bases of everyday action, not tribal identity. He overstated his case (“the African townsman is a townsman”) to make a political point against patterns of colonial administration of African populations, which insisted on a traditionalism (itself invented by the colonial rulers) that saw a non-modern tribal primitivism pervading every area of interaction among Africans. Mitchell agreed with Gluckman’s anti-colonialist political point but saw dangers in the contrast as forcing too hard a distinction between urban and rural. Much of Mitchell’s work was to demonstrate the inadequacy of such a dualism, concentrating instead on the continuing emergent multiplicities of social life that refuted such dualistic thinking.
14. The whole matter of scale is important in the discussion of events and the relation of particular kinds of interactive event and the events involving larger social and group processes. This is an area that demands attention for which I do not have space here. In anthropology, Godfrey Wilson (1941–1942) raised the matter, and his perspective was influential on the kinds of questions that Gluckman and especially Mitchell were asking in relation to situational analysis. I note the important work of Reidar Groenhaug (1978) in this regard. Contemporary discussion on the local and global is a version of these kinds of issues concerning scale and the relation of small-scale interactional events to larger processes.

15. An egregious misrepresentation (and trivialization) of situational analysis along these lines is that of Ferguson (1999).

16. Marx’s (1852) analysis is important to the argument that Deleuze (2004) develops regarding the event. He disagrees with Marx concerning the event of Louis Napoleon as a farcical repetition. Deleuze insists that it is better grasped as an original event that does not so much tragically repeat the past as open up irreducible creative and dynamic potential.

17. The British sociological orientation in anthropology was not as prone to the kinds of culturological totalism and bounding that were prevalent in American cultural anthropology. Much of the anthropological postmodernist subjectivist approach has been initiated from within North American perspectives, and the matter of culture seems to operate as a continually nagging paradox.

18. In Sahlins’s analysis, memory is a type of virtual. In relation to a Deleuzian notion of the virtual (see Deleuze and Guattari 1994; Kapferer 2005a, 2005b; Thanem and Linstead 2006), it is a kind of totality of potential (past, present, and future) that is a real but not necessarily an actual and evident overtly in practice. Sahlins’s independent development of a notion of the virtual that is similar to that of Deleuze may overcome the kinds of culture contact relativism that the Mancunians would have complained about in Sahlins’s work and which they would have seen as extending from the Malinowskian perspective that Gluckman criticized.

19. The anti-Hegelianism of Deleuze and Guattari—indeed, a powerful commitment to the kind of break that Nietzsche pursued—distinguishes their perspective and underpins their positivity.

20. Recent debates in 2010 involving the American Anthropological Association, which was pressured to abandon an expressly anti-science position, are a case in point.

References


